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COMMENT
THE MACHINE GUN STATUTE: ITS
CONTROVERSIAL PAST AND POSSIBLE FUTURE
Leslie Wepner*
INTRODUCTION
On March 10, 1992, Alfonso Lopez carried a .38 caliber handgun and
five bullets into a school zone.1 In April 1992, on two consecutive days,
Raymond Rybar, a federally licensed firearms dealer, attended a gun show
where he brought, offered to sell, and was paid for both a 7.62 millimeter
and .45 caliber submachine gun.2 In 2002, Angel Raich, who cultivated her
own marijuana, and Diane Monson, who purchased marijuana from
unknown sources, were found to possess marijuana in their homes.3 These
individuals were found guilty of violating federal statutes outlawing
possession of a handgun in a school zone,4 possession of a machine gun, 5
and possession of marijuana,6 respectively.
Although carrying a gun in a school zone, possessing a machine gun, and
possessing marijuana all involve criminal-like activities, Congress has not
regulated all three acts through federal statutes in exactly the same manner.
Moreover, the federal judiciary's responses to challenges to such statutes
under the Commerce Clause have varied.
For example, the Gun-Free School Zone Act, which made it unlawful to
possess a gun in a school zone, was struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court
as violating the Commerce Clause in United States v. Lopez.7 More
recently, in Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court upheld, in the face of a
Commerce Clause challenge, the Controlled Substance Act (CSA), which
makes it unlawful to possess marijuana. 8 Although these decisions may
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law. I am especially grateful to
Professor Daniel C. Richman for his invaluable guidance, to the Fordham Law Review
Editorial Board for assisting me through the publication process, and to my family (current
and future) for loving and supporting me unconditionally.
1. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
2. See United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 275 (3d Cir. 1996).
3. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25-26 (2005).
4. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (2000).
6. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 844(a).(2000).
7. 514 U.S. at 551.
8. Raich, 545 U.S. 1.
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appear to be contradictory-the statute in Lopez was overturned while in
Raich the statute was upheld-the reasoning behind the Court's two
decisions is extraordinarily similar.9 Yet, despite the Supreme Court's
consistent approach to the Commerce Clause, while sitting on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, then-Judge Samuel A. Alito
dissented in United States v. Rybar,'0 where the majority had applied that
consistent reasoning established in Lopez and reaffirmed in Raich.
Specifically, in Rybar, applying the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause
reasoning, Judge Alito was unable sufficiently to distinguish possession of a
handgun in a school zone from general possession of a machine gun to
justify federal statutory prevention of the latter but not the former." I In
view of Justice Alito's elevation to the Supreme Court, his opinion on
matters such as the Commerce Clause is more significant and more relevant
than ever. This Comment will thus analyze Justice Alito's troubling dissent
in Rybar-how it differs from Supreme Court precedent and what impact
his reasoning could have today.
Part I of this Comment details the historical evolution of Commerce
Clause challenges before the Supreme Court, focusing on the precedent
established by Lopez pertaining to criminal legislation that has recently
been reaffirmed by Raich.12 Part II then explores the controversy that the
Third Circuit faced in Rybar over the constitutionality of the Machine Gun
Statute, laying out the differences between the majority opinion and Judge
Alito's dissent. 13 Finally, Part III of this Comment discusses the reasons
why Judge Alito's dissent improperly applied the Supreme Court precedent
established by Lopez, and concludes, based on precedent, that the Machine
Gun Statute would likely be upheld should the current Supreme Court ever
consider its constitutionality. 14
I. SUPREME COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Origin of the Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Commerce
Clause
The Constitution gives Congress certain enumerated powers to enact
legislation. 15 One such power is the power vested in Congress through the
9. See infra Part I.C-D.
10. 103 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 1996).
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. See infra Part I.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III.
15. U.S. Const. art. I; see Mark C. Christie, Economic Regulation in the United States:
The Constitutional Framework, 40 U. Rich. L. Rev. 949, 972 (2006) ("Since the federal
government is not a government of plenary powers and there is no textual federal police
power, the federal government can regulate only through a direct grant of power enumerated
in the Constitution.").
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Commerce Clause.16 The Commerce Clause states that Congress shall have
the power "[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States." 17
The judiciary first identified the purpose of the Commerce Clause in
Gibbons v. Ogden.18 In Gibbons, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote,
"Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is
intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and
parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for
carrying on that intercourse."' 19 Congress, however, was not at that time,
nor is it today, vested with unlimited power to regulate interstate commerce.
The primary purpose of the Commerce Clause was initially "to preclude the
kind of discriminatory state legislation that had once been permissible."20
Nevertheless, some activities such as manufacturing, mining, and
production were determined early on by the Court to be better left for
regulation by the states because they were strictly "local" activities. 21
Congress's enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 and the
Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890 represented a significant turning point in
Commerce Clause legislation. 22 At first, such legislation was met with
some resistance. 23 Yet, the Court recognized that "where the interstate and
intrastate aspects of commerce were so mingled together that full regulation
of interstate commerce required incidental regulation of intrastate
commerce, the Commerce Clause authorized such regulation." 24 Finally, in
1935, the Court drew the distinction between direct and indirect effects on
16. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
17. Id.
18. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
19. Id. at 189-90.
20. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16 (2005).
21. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 119-20 (1942) (describing the historical
rationale for regulation by statutes where the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately upheld a statute
that regulated farmers' homegrown consumption of wheat). For additional examples of
cases in which local activities were involved, see infra note 23.
22. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 554 (1995); see also Robert A. Schapiro
& William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism: Power and Perspective in Commerce
Clause Adjudication, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1199, 1218 (2003) (describing the "turning point"
in Commerce Clause legislation).
23. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936) ("Mining brings the
subject matter of commerce into existence. Commerce disposes of it."); United Leather
Workers Int'l Union, Local Lodge or Union No. 66 v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S.
457, 464-65 (1924) (emphasizing the need for interstate commerce to be involved in order
for Congress to regulate rightfully under the Commerce Clause); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251, 272 (1918) ("The making of goods and the mining of coal are not commerce, nor
does the fact that these things are to be afterwards shipped or used in interstate commerce,
make their production a part thereof." (citing Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R.R. v.
Yurkonis, 238 U.S. 439 (1915))); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895)
(holding that Congress could not regulate manufacturing); see also Anthony E. Varona &
Kevin Layton, Anchoring Justice: The Constitutionality of the Local Law Enforcement
Enhancement Act in United States v. Morrison's Shifting Seas, 12 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 9,
11-12 (2001) (describing the resistance to early Commerce Clause legislation).
24. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554 (referring to the Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342
(1914)).
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interstate commerce: direct effects involve those activities within
Congress's power to control; indirect effects involve those activities not
within Congress's control.25 The distinction between direct and indirect
effects at that time became a necessary component for the Court in
evaluating Commerce Clause challenges. 26
At first, federal criminal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause in some
instances followed a direct versus indirect framework.27 In Champion v.
Ames, the Court held that Congress was entitled to regulate specific items
that would enter commerce. 28 Further, in Hoke v. United States, the Court
upheld a statute prohibiting the transportation into commerce of any
"woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any
other immoral purpose. '29 These cases illustrate the growing trend of
Congress regulating criminal activities via the Commerce Clause, but also
emphasize the necessity of a direct impact on commerce to justify
legislation.
Federal criminal legislation was not, however, only based on the
Commerce Clause. In 1914, Congress relied on the federal government's
power to raise revenues and to tax to enact the Harrison Act, the
predecessor to the CSA. 30 Congress enacted the Harrison Act to "exert
control over the possession and sale of narcotics ... by requiring producers,
distributors, and purchasers to register with the Federal Government, by
assessing taxes against parties so registered, and by regulating the issuance
of prescriptions." 31 Similarly, in 1937, Congress passed the Marihuana Tax
Act 32 that did not outlaw marijuana but rather imposed tax and registration
requirements. 33 Relying on Congress's power to raise revenue and tax
eventually proved to be futile when it came to criminal legislation.34
25. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 548-50 (1935);
see also Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 22, at 1214 (describing the early direct/indirect
distinction).
26. See Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 548-50.
27. See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903); see also Caminetti v. United States,
242 U.S. 470, 486 (1917) (holding that Congress could prohibit transportation of women in
interstate commerce for debauchery purposes); Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242
U.S. 311, 320 (1917) (holding that Congress may regulate the transportation of intoxicating
liquors); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 317-18 (1913) (upholding a statute prohibiting
the transportation into commerce of women or girls for "prostitution or debauchery"); Susan
A. Ehrlich, The Increasing Federalization of Crime, 32 Ariz. St. L.J. 825, 832 (2000)
(highlighting the first few criminal cases).
28. See Champion, 188 U.S. at 321-22 (upholding the regulation of a lottery ticket); see
also Norman Abrams & Sara Sun Beale, Federal Criminal Law and Its Enforcement 21-22
(3d ed. 2000).
29. Hoke, 227 U.S. at 317-18.
30. See Lana D. Harrison et al., Cannabis Use in the United States: Implications for
Policy 237-28 (1995), available at http://www.cedro-uva.org/lib/harrison.cannabis.pdf.
31. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10-11 (2005).
32. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (holding certain parts of the
Marihuana Tax Act unconstitutional).
33. Raich, 545 U.S. at 11; see also infra note 93.
34. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 11-12 (explaining how relying on Congress's power to tax
fell out of favor).
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Justifying criminal legislation through the Commerce Clause eventually
became quite an effective substitute.35 Part I.B evaluates the revolutionary
approach to Commerce Clause legislation and the Supreme Court's
responses to the eventual challenges of such statutes.
B. The Birth of the Substantial Economic Effects Test
In 1937, a major shift in congressional legislation occurred that had a
substantial impact on federal criminal legislation.36 That year the Court
upheld the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) against a Commerce
Clause challenge and determined that Congress had the power to regulate
activities that "have such a close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that
commerce from burdens and obstructions," thereby eliminating the
necessity to find a direct effect on interstate commerce. 37 In NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court found that Jones & Laughlin had violated
the NLRA by engaging in unfair labor practices by discriminating against
employees.38 Then in 1941, in United States v. Darby, the Court upheld the
Fair Labor Standards Act that set up a scheme to "prevent[] the shipment in
interstate commerce of certain products and commodities produced in the
United States under labor conditions" where there is a failure to "conform
to standards set up by the Act."'39 One year later, in Wickard v. Filburn, the
Court upheld the application of amendments to the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1938 that regulated the production and consumption of homegrown
wheat. 40 Explicitly rejecting the earlier distinction between direct and
indirect effects on interstate commerce, 41 the Court stated,
[E]ven if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it
exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this
irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time
have been'defined as "direct" or "indirect."'42
The Court had further noted that although the farmer's activity of
consuming homegrown wheat in Filburn seemed "trivial," taken together
35. See id. at 15 (explaining that the Controlled Substance Act (CSA) is justified under
the Commerce Clause).
36. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 554-59 (1995).
37. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
38. Id. at 22, 48-49.
39. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 109, 118 (1941) ("The power of Congress
over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce among the states. It
extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of
the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the
attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce.").
40. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942).
41. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
42. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
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with others "similarly situated," the farmer's activities could become
significant. 43
Having established that Congress could regulate activity that has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, the Court continued to uphold
numerous statutes that arguably had more of a social impact on society than
an economic effect.44 By 1971, the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause
power was defined by the Court to include regulation of the channels and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, in addition to those activities that
have a substantial economic effect on the economy. 45 In Perez v. United
States, a case involving criminal legislation, the Court acknowledged that
"[e]xtortionate credit transactions, though purely intrastate, may in the
judgment of Congress affect interstate commerce. '"46 This landmark
decision represented the Court's departure from rationalizing criminal
legislation through ascertaining whether there was a direct effect on
interstate commerce to a more liberal approach involving evaluating
whether there was a substantial cumulative economic impact on interstate
commerce. 47  As discussed in Part I.C, however, Commerce Clause
limitations were, with hindsight, inevitable.
C. Lopez: The Supreme Court Limits the Substantial Economic Effects
Test
The Court, in United States v. Lopez, finally established judicial
limitations on Commerce Clause legislation.48 The Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990, the statute in question in Lopez, made it a federal offense "for
any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." 49 The Court
acknowledged that NLRB, Darby, and Wickard "ushered in an era of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence," 50 which was in part a result of the
43. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995) (citing Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-
28).
44. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-301 (1964) (upholding a
statute that made it unlawful to not serve African Americans at a local Alabama restaurant);
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964) (upholding the
public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that precluded racial
discrimination, in this case, at a Georgia hotel).
45. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558; see also Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150
(1971) ("The Commerce Clause reaches, in the main, three categories of problems. First, the
use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce which Congress deems are being misused,
as, for example, the shipment of stolen goods... or of persons who have been
kidnapped .... Second, protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as, for
example, the destruction of an aircraft. . . , or persons or things in commerce, as, for
example, thefts from interstate shipments . . . . Third, those activities affecting
commerce ... ").
46. Perez, 402 U.S. at 154.
47. See Abrams & Beale, supra note 28, at 38.
48. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565.
49. Id. at 551 (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. Id. at 556; see also supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
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changing economic landscape in the country.51 The Court, however, also
acknowledged that modem-era precedents were "subject to outer limits." 52
For the first time in a long history of liberally drawing a link to interstate
commerce, the Court, unlike Congress, could not rationalize a way to link
guns in school zones to interstate commerce. 53
The government had argued in Lopez that the statute involved the
possibility that possession of a firearm in a school zone would substantially
affect interstate commerce. 54 The government had contended that firearms
could lead to violent crimes, and that violent crimes could lead to heavy
costs on the government in dealing with such violent crimes, or reduce the
desire for individuals to travel to areas "perceived to be unsafe. ' 55 Finally,
the government had argued that a serious threat to the educational process
exists when guns are allowed in school zones. 56
In accord with the government's position, Justice Stephen Breyer wrote
in his Lopez dissent that "Congress ... could rationally conclude that
schools fall on the commercial side of the line."'57 However, the majority
opinion rejected these arguments and held that "[t]he possession of a gun in
a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through
repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce." 58
Moreover, the Court concluded that the "[r]espondent was a local student at
a local school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate
commerce, and there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm
have any concrete tie to interstate commerce." 59  The Court determined
that, unlike earlier cases such as Wickard and Perez,60 connecting
possession of guns in a school zone to interstate commerce required too
tenuous a link.61 Finally, the Court expressed a federalism concern, stating
that "[w]hen Congress criminalizes conduct already denounced as criminal
51. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556 ("Enterprises that had once been local or at most regional in
nature had become national in scope. But the doctrinal change also reflected a view that
earlier Commerce Clause cases artificially had constrained the authority of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce.").
52. Id. at 557.
53. Id. at 559-60 (stating that the Court has "upheld a wide variety of congressional Acts
regulating intrastate economic activity where we have concluded that the activity
substantially affected interstate commerce. Examples include the regulation of intrastate
coal mining, [Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264
(1981)], intrastate extortionate credit transactions, [Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146
(1971)], restaurants utilizing substantial interstate supplies, [Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294, 299-301 (1964)], inns and hotels catering to interstate guests, [Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964)], and production and consumption
of homegrown wheat, [Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 199-20 (1942)]").
54. Id. at 563-64.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 564.
57. Id. at 629 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 567 (majority opinion).
59. Id.
60. See supra notes 21, 45.
61. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
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by the States, it effects a change in the sensitive relation between federal
and state criminal jurisdiction. '62
Lopez was a landmark decision and featured a sharply divided Court.63
The four dissenters have been interpreted to have found that the following
reasoning should be applied:
[L]ocal activities may be regulated under the Commerce Clause where
they significantly affect interstate commerce; ... these local activities
must be considered cumulatively in viewing their effect on interstate
commerce; ... [and] the court's inquiry is limited to whether Congress
could have had a rational basis for concluding the regulated activity
sufficiently affected interstate commerce.64
The dissenting Justices found that a rational basis existed to warrant
upholding the statute. 65  For example, Justice John Paul Stevens
emphasized the commercial nature of firearms and therefore the
appropriateness of Congress regulating firearms. 66 Additionally, Justice
Breyer found that "[n]umerous reports and studies-generated both inside
and outside government-make clear that Congress could reasonably have
found the empirical connection that its law, implicitly or explicitly, asserts"
to rationalize upholding the Gun-Free School Zones Act. 6 7 The dissenters,
however, obviously could not win over the Justices who formed the
majority.
Despite strong dissents, Lopez had staying power. In a similarly
reasoned case, United States v. Morrison, the Court held that a statute that
provided a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated
62. Id. at 561 n.3; see Christie, supra note 15, at 977 ("Believers in... federalism
cheered ... Lopez ... since the Supreme Court was, for the first time since the 1930s, trying
to define some limits to federal commerce power."); see also Christina E. Coleman, Note,
The Future of the Federalism Revolution: Gonzales v. Raich and the Legacy of the
Rehnquist Court, 37 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 803, 818 (2006) (acknowledging that "the so-called
revolutionary decision[] in Lopez ... w[as] so limited that very little had changed").
63. Chief Justice William Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas
joined. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice
O'Connor joined. Id. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Thomas filed a concurring
opinion. Id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justices John Paul Stevens and David Souter
filed dissenting opinions. Id. at 602 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 603 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. Id. at 615 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
64. See United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 277 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (summarizing the Lopez dissent).
65. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 603 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. See id. at 602-03 ("Guns are both articles of commerce and articles that can be used
to restrain commerce. Their possession is the consequence, either directly or indirectly, of
commercial activity. In my judgment, Congress' power to regulate commerce in firearms
includes the power to prohibit possession of guns at any location because of their potentially
harmful use; it necessarily follows that Congress may also prohibit their possession in
particular markets.").
67. Id. at 619 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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violence was an unconstitutional application of the Commerce Clause. 68 In
Morrison,69 the Court acknowledged the change in the Commerce Clause
trend and held that gender-motivated violent crimes are just as
noneconomic as is possession of a gun in a school zone.70 The majority
again cited federalism issues. 71 In the end, the Court could not draw a link
to interstate commerce and thus invalidated the statute. 72
The Court also stated in Morrison that during the period between
Wickard and Lopez, the Court might have upheld the statute in Morrison
because the nation had experienced "a period in which the law enjoyed a
stable understanding that congressional power under the Commerce Clause,
complemented by the authority of the Necessary and Proper Clause.' 73
However, the Court noted that, after Lopez, the substantial cumulative
effects test was subject to more exacting scrutiny and demanded a "new
criterion of review."'74
Just a decade later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its Lopez holding in
Raich.75 Part I.D evaluates the less than revolutionary approach taken by
the Supreme Court in Raich.
D. The Court's Recent Take on Commerce Clause Analysis as Exhibited in
Raich
Lopez involved regulating possession of a handgun in a school zone-"a
discrete area unlikely to have a meaningful aggregate effect on
commerce." 76 Gonzales v. Raich, however, involved regulating possession
of marijuana anywhere. 77 Raich began as a case brought by Angel Raich
and Diane Monson, users of marijuana for medicinal purposes made lawful
under California law, against the Attorney General of the United States and
the head of the Drug Enforcement Administration, seeking an injunction
68. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000); see also Coleman, supra note
62, at 818 (acknowledging that similar to Lopez, Morrison "w[as] so limited that very little
had changed").
69. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598.
Justice Thomas concurred and filed an opinion. Id. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice
Souter filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Id.
at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice
Stevens joined, and in which Justices Souter and Ginsburg joined in part. Id. at 655 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 613 (majority opinion).
71. See Linda Greenhouse, The Rehnquist Court and its Imperiled States' Rights Legacy,
N.Y. Times, June 12, 2005, at WK3 (pointing out that Justice O'Connor's "commitment to
the federalism agenda had led her. . . to vote with the majority to strike down a central
portion of the Violence Against Women Act [in Morrison], which authorized victims of
crimes 'motivated by gender' to sue their attackers in federal court").
72. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18.
73. Id (citing U.S. Const. art. I., § 8, cl. 18).
74. Id.
75. See infra Part I.D.
76. United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 282 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing Lopez).
77. See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 14-15 (2005).
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and declaratory relief "prohibiting the enforcement of the... [CSA]."'78
The Court in Raich had to determine whether Congress had the authority
under the Commerce Clause to enact the CSA 79 and thereby override a
state-established exception to the general ban on possessing marijuana for
medicinal purposes. 80 The CSA makes it unlawful to "to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, a controlled substance."'81 Further, marijuana had been classified
as a Schedule I drug under 21 U.S.C. § 812(c), 82 that is, a controlled
substance. California was the first state to authorize limited use of
marijuana for medicinal purposes. 83
The Court84 preliminarily concluded that "[w]e have never required
Congress to legislate with scientific exactitude. When Congress decides
that the 'total incidence' of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it
78. Id. at 7.
79. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
80. Raich, 545 U.S. at 15. The respondents challenged not the constitutionality of the
CSA but rather whether CSA's "categorical prohibition of the manufacture and possession of
marijuana as applied to the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for medical
purposes pursuant to California law exceeds Congress' authority under the Commerce
Clause." Id.
81. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000).
82. Raich, 545 U.S. at 12 ("The CSA categorizes all controlled substances into five
schedules. The drugs are grouped together based on their accepted medical uses, the
potential for abuse, and their psychological and physical effects on the body.... In enacting
the CSA, Congress classified marijuana as a Schedule I drug .... Schedule I drugs are
categorized as such because of their high potential for abuse, lack of any accepted medical
use, and absence of any accepted safety for use in medically supervised treatment. These
three factors, in varying gradations, are also used to categorize drugs in the other four
schedules. For example, Schedule II substances also have a high potential for abuse which
may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence, but unlike Schedule I drugs, they
have a currently accepted medical use. By classifying marijuana as a Schedule I drug, as
opposed to listing it on a lesser schedule, the manufacture, distribution, or possession of
marijuana became a criminal offense, with the sole exception being use of the drug as part of
a Food and Drug Administration pre-approved research study." (citing 21 U.S.C. § 812
(2000) throughout) (internal citations omitted)); see also Casey L. Carhart, Will the Ever-
Swinging Pendulum of Commerce Clause Interpretation Ever Stop? A Casenote on
Gonzales v. Raich, 27 Whittier L. Rev. 833, 838 (2006) (discussing the classification of
drugs).
83. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 5-6 ("In 1913, California was one of the first States to
prohibit the sale and possession of marijuana, and at the end of the century, California
became the first State to authorize limited use of the drug for medicinal purposes. In 1996,
California voters passed... the Compassionate Use Act of 1996. The proposition was
designed to ensure that 'seriously ill' residents of the State have access to marijuana for
medical purposes, and to encourage Federal and State Governments to take steps towards
ensuring the safe and affordable distribution of the drug to patients in need. The Act
create[d] an exemption from criminal prosecution for physicians, as well as for patients and
primary caregivers who possess or cultivate marijuana for medicinal purposes with the
recommendation or approval of a physician.").
84. Justice Stevens delivered the majority opinion in which Justices Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsberg, and Breyer joined. Raich, 545 U.S. 1. Justice Scalia concurred. Id. at 33 (Scalia, J.
concurring). Justice O'Connor delivered a dissent in which Justices Rehnquist and Thomas
joined. Id. at 42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also filed a separate dissent. Id.
at 57 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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may regulate the entire class." 85  Relying on the Court's rationale in
Wickard, the Court further established that, "if [the Court] concludes that
failure to regulate [a] class of activity would undercut the regulation of the
interstate market in that commodity," Congress can regulate that activity. 86
Although marijuana is illegal and wheat, the product at issue in Wickard,
was not, the Court in Raich found the similarities between the two cases to
be "striking." 87 As the Court noted, a primary purpose of the CSA is "to
control the supply and demand of controlled substances in both lawful and
unlawful drug markets. '88 Congress, the Court concluded, "had a rational
basis for concluding that leaving home-consumed marijuana outside federal
control would similarly affect price and market conditions. '89 Moreover,
the Court acknowledged that it "need not determine whether respondents'
activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in
fact, but only whether a 'rational basis' exists for so concluding."90 The
Court held that a rational basis existed for such a statute and thus upheld the
constitutionality of the CSA and its applicability to medicinal marijuana in
the state of Califomia.91
In drawing its conclusion, despite upholding the constitutionality of the
statute in Raich, the Court remained loyal to its holding in Lopez by
distinguishing Raich from Lopez.92 First, the Court acknowledged that the
85. Id. at 17-18 (majority opinion) (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-55
(1971)); see M. Wesley Clark, Can State "Medical" Marijuana Statutes Survive The
Sovereign's Federal Drug Laws? A Toke Too Far, 35 U. Bait. L. Rev. 1, 22 (2005) ("Such
an inevitable increase of the marijuana supply in the California market would, when
combined with that to be expected from the eight or so other 'medical' marijuana states, lead
to the quite rational conclusion, one which Congress could have reached, 'that the aggregate
impact on the national market of all the transactions exempted from federal supervision is
unquestionably substantial."' (quoting Raich, 545 U.S. at 32)).
86. Raich, 545 U.S. at 18.
87. Id.
88. Raich, 545 U.S. at 19.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 22 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995)).
91. See id.
92. See Richard A. Epstein, The Federalism Decisions of Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor: Is Half a Loaf Enough?, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1793, 1803-04 (2006) (finding that
Raich was distinguishable from Lopez and therefore not inconsistent with the Lopez
holding); Nolan Mitchell, Preserving the Privilege: Codification of Selective Waiver and the
Limits of Federal Power over State Courts, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 691, 733 (2006) (finding that
instead of overturning Lopez and Morrison, Raich limited those "cases to their facts"). From
a federalism perspective, the Court in Raich deviated from its position in Lopez. See Christie,
supra note 15, at 977 (finding that Raich symbolized that the "modern 'federalism
revolution' was short-lived"); Coleman, supra note 62, at 863-64 ("The Raich holding's
expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause undermined the Rehnquist Court's shift
toward federalism and the restriction of congressional power with the landmark decisions of
Lopez and Morrison."). Scalia, typically a federalism devotee, surprisingly voted with the
majority in Raich to uphold the CSA. See infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text; see
also George D. Brown, Counterrevolution?-National Criminal Law After Raich?, 66 Ohio
St. L.J. 947, 948-49 (2005) (finding that in Raich, "the Supreme Court called a halt to the
New Federalism" but that "[n]oticeably absent from Justice Stevens' majority opinion [in
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statute in Raich involved a "concededly valid statutory scheme," whereas
no such statutory scheme in the Gun-Free School Zone Act existed. 93 The
Court found that the Gun-Free School Zone Act involved no economic
activity such that the possession of a gun did not have any "connection to
past interstate activity or a predictable impact on future commercial
activity. '94  Moreover, the Court concluded that .'[w]here economic
activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that
activity will be sustained.' ' 95 Furthermore, the Court found that those
activities regulated by the CSA are "quintessentially economic" where
"[e]conomics' refers to 'the production, distribution, and consumption of
commodities." 96 As such, the Court found the CSA to be a statute that
"regulates the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities for
which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market." 97  In
contrast, the Court in Lopez and later the Third Circuit in Rybar, found no
economic component to the Gun-Free School Zone Act.98 Finally, that the
marijuana at issue in Raich was being used for medicinal purposes did not
diminish the economic nature of marijuana use because "most of the
substances classified in the CSA have a useful and legitimate medical
purpose."99  Thus, the Court distinguished the CSA from the Gun-Free
School Zone Act, thereby preserving the precedential impact of Lopez.
Raich] were any references to federalism in general.... Instead, Justice Stevens treated the
case as presenting a classic Commerce Clause problem.").
93. Raich, 545 U.S. at 23. The statutory scheme emerged after President Richard Nixon
declared a "war on drugs" just after he took office in 1969. Id. at 10; see also Melissa T.
Aoyagi, Beyond Punitive Prohibition: Liberalizing the Dialogue on International Drug
Policy, 37 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 555, 561 n.19 (2005) (explaining that the "war on drugs"
concept originated with President Nixon). Prior to 1969, marijuana was first regulated in
1937 under the Marihuana Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (repealed 1970).
Instead of outlawing marijuana, the Tax Act "imposed registration and reporting
requirements for all individuals importing, producing, selling, or dealing in marijuana" and
thus "burdensome administrative requirements" existed for doctors wishing to prescribe
marijuana for medical purposes. Raich, 545 U.S. at 11. Then, the federal drug control
agencies were reorganized as follows: "The Bureau of Narcotics, then housed in the
Department of Treasury, merged with the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control, then housed in the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), to create the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs ..." Id. at 12. Finally, after the Marihuana Tax Act was overruled in
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970 that consisted of three titles: "Title I relates to the
prevention and treatment of narcotic addicts through HEW (now the Department of Health
and Human Services). Title II.. . addresses drug control and enforcement as administered
by the Attorney General and the [Drug Enforcement Agency]. Title III concerns the import
and export of controlled substances." Raich, 545 U.S at 12 & n.19. Title II, more commonly
known as the CSA, was devised to "prevent the diversion of drugs from legitimate to illicit
channels." Id. at 13 (citing United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975)).
94. Raich, 545 U.S. at 22-23.
95. Id. at 25 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000)).
96. Id. at 25-26 (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id. at 26.
98. See infra Part II.
99. Raich, 545 U.S. at 27 (stating that if "the principal dissent contends[] the personal
cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes is beyond the outer
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As in Lopez, however, the Court in Raich was not in full agreement.
Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurrence, having determined that although
he agreed with the majority, he believed his "understanding of the doctrinal
foundation on which that holding rests is, if not inconsistent with that of the
Court, at least [to be] more nuanced."' 00 Justice Scalia noted that activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce are not themselves part of
interstate commerce and "the power to regulate them cannot come from the
Commerce Clause alone."'' He explained that Congress's regulatory
authority is also derived from the Necessary and Proper Clause of the
Constitution.' 02 Moreover, he reasoned,
[T]he authority to enact laws necessary and proper for the regulation of
interstate commerce is not limited to laws governing intrastate activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce. Where necessary to make a
regulation of interstate commerce effective, Congress may regulate even
those intrastate activities that do not themselves substantially affect
interstate commerce.' 03
Justice Scalia went on to recognize the need to establish limitations on
regulating noneconomic activity as established in Lopez and Morrison. 104
Further, Justice Scalia wrote that "although Congress's authority to
regulate intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce is
broad, it does not permit the Court to 'pile inference upon inference,' in
order to establish that noneconomic activity has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce." 10 5 Justice Scalia wrote that Lopez and Morrison "do
not declare noneconomic intrastate activities to be categorically beyond the
reach of the Federal Government" and that "[n]either case involved the
power of Congress to exert control over intrastate activities in connection
with a more comprehensive scheme of regulation."']0 6
Finally, Justice Scalia emphasized that the Necessary and Proper Clause
does not give the government carte blanche in regulating, writing that "even
when the end is constitutional and legitimate, the means must be
appropriate and plainly adapted to that end."' 1 7 In applying these principles
to the case at hand, Justice Scalia, usually viewed as a federalism advocate
limits of Congress' Commerce Clause authority, it must also be true that such personal use
of marijuana (or any other homegrown drug) for recreational purposes is also beyond those
'outer limits,' whether or not a State elects to authorize or even regulate such use" (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
100. Id. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring); see Linda Greenhouse, Court's Term a Turn Back
to the Center: Justices Didn't Follow Usual Alignments, N.Y. Times, July 4, 2005, at AlO
(noting that Scalia's concurrence in Raich was "anomalous" and thus readily noticeable to
the legal community).
101. Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 34-35.
104. Id. at 35-36.
105. Id. at 36 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995)).
106. Id. at 38-39.
107. Id. at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and thus a surprising member of the majority here, 10 8 acknowledged that
Congress certainly has the power under the Commerce Clause to extinguish
the interstate market in Schedule I controlled substances (which include
marijuana) and that what is important is "eradicating Schedule I substances
from interstate commerce."' 10 9 Justice Scalia agreed with the majority that
marijuana for both medicinal and for personal use would never be "more
than an instant from the interstate market.' 10
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor dissented from the majority in Raich.111
Justice O'Connor wrote that "[o]ne of federalism's chief virtues, of course,
is that it promotes innovation by allowing for the possibility that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country." 12 Justice O'Connor was troubled by fact that
the Court['s] sanction[] [of] an application of the federal Controlled
Substances Act that extinguishes that experiment, without any proof that
the personal cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for medicinal
purposes, if economic activity in the first place, has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce and is therefore an appropriate subject of federal
regulation. 113
Moreover, Justice O'Connor found the rule and the result "irreconcilable"
with Lopez and Morrison.114 Justice O'Connor wrote that the majority's
holding implied "that the federal regulation of local activity is immune to
Commerce Clause challenge because Congress chose to act with an
ambitious, all-encompassing statute, rather than piecemeal."11 5
Furthermore she concluded that "allowing Congress to set the terms of the
constitutional debate in this way, that is, by packaging regulation of local
activity in broader schemes, is tantamount to removing meaningful limits
on the Commerce Clause." 1 6 Justice O'Connor wrote,
If the Court is right, then Lopez stands for nothing more than a drafting
guide: Congress should have described the relevant crime as transfer or
possession of a firearm anywhere in the nation-thus including
commercial and noncommercial activity, and clearly encompassing some
activity with assuredly substantial effect on interstate commerce.
108. See supra notes 92, 100-06 and accompanying text.
109. Raich, 545 U.S. at 40 (Scalia, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 40.
111. Id. at 42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justices Rehnquist and Thomas joined Justice
O'Connor in her dissent.
112. Id. at 42 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Say
U.S. May Prohibit the Use of Medical Marijuana, N.Y. Times, June 7, 2005, at A21 ("As a
prime mover of the court's federalism revolution, Justice O'Connor did not hide her dismay
[in Raich].").
113. Raich, 545 U.S. at 43 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
114. Id.
115. Id. at45.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 46 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Justice O'Connor went on to conclude that medicinal and non-medicinal
use can properly be segregated and regulated differently.11 8 Further, from a
more economic standpoint, Justice O'Connor found that "the homegrown
cultivation and personal possession and use of marijuana for medicinal
purposes has no apparent commercial character. Everyone agrees that the
marijuana at issue in this case was never in the stream of commerce, and
neither were the supplies for growing it."" 19 Believing that Wickard did not
establish as far-reaching congressional control over activities as O'Connor
thought the majority found Wickard to have established, she wrote that
"Wickard did not hold or imply that small-scale production of commodities
is always economic, and automatically within Congress' reach."' 120
In a separate dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas added that "the question is
whether Congress' legislation is essential to the regulation of interstate
commerce itself-not whether the legislation extends only to economic
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce" and that "[t]he
majority's rewriting of the Commerce Clause seems to be rooted in the
belief that, unless the Commerce Clause covers the entire web of human
activity, Congress will be left powerless to regulate the national economy
effectively."']2 1 Moreover, from a federalism perspective, Justice Thomas
wrote that "if Congress can regulate this under the Commerce Clause, then
it can regulate virtually anything-and the Federal Government is no longer
one of limited and enumerated powers."' 122
Having discussed the evolution of the Supreme Court's approach to the
Commerce Clause, Part II explores the conflict that emerged in the Third
Circuit in United States v. Rybar.
II. Two DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE MACHINE GUN STATUTE
As highlighted by Raich, the Supreme Court maintained a consistent
approach to Commerce Clause legislation as first enunciated in Lopez.123
After Lopez, but prior to Raich, a decision emerged from the Third Circuit,
United States v. Rybar, which upheld a general congressional ban on
machine guns. However, not every Third Circuit judge to preside over this
case concurred. Judge Alito, now Justice Alito of the Supreme Court,
adamantly dissented from this decision and found that his peers failed to
accord proper deference to the Lopez decision. 124 Section II.A dissects the
majority's fimdings in Rybar and section II.B analyzes Judge Alito's
contrasting approach.
118. Id. at 48 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2000)).
119. Id. at 50.
120. Id. at 51.
121. Id. at 67-70 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 57-58.
123. See supra Part I.D.
124. See infra Part II.B.
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A. The Majority's Analysis
The Machine Gun Statute makes it "unlawful for any person to transfer
or possess a machine gun."'12 5 The Machine Gun Statute was challenged in
Rybar on constitutional grounds as an improper application of the
Commerce Clause. 126  Appellant Rybar argued that the statute was
unconstitutional because it failed the substantial economic effects test under
the Commerce Clause. 127 Appellant also raised a federalism concern
similar to the one raised in Lopez, arguing that such regulation was better
left for states. 128
1. The Majority Found Lopez Distinguishable
In upholding the Machine Gun Statute, the Third Circuit majority
distinguished the legislative process of both Rybar and Lopez. No
legislative findings had existed to aid the Supreme Court in its analysis of
Lopez. 129 In Lopez, the Court acknowledged that legislative findings are
not necessary to aid the Court in understanding the burden an activity has
on interstate commerce. 130 Nonetheless, the Court hinted that legislative
findings would have been helpful. 13 1
In Rybar, however, the Third Circuit was able to consider legislative
findings regarding the Machine Gun Statute. 132  Although legislative
findings did not actually "accompany" the passage of the Machine Gun
Statute itself,133 the legislative findings were "generated throughout
Congress' history of firearms regulation" and "link[ed] both the flow of
125. 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (2000). A machine gun is defined as
any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot,
automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function
of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such
weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of
parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun,
and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such
parts are in the possession or under the control of a person.
26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (2000).
126. United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 274 (3d Cir. 1996).
127. Id. at 277-78.
128. Id. at 278; see Antony Barone Kolenc, Commerce Clause Challenges After United
States v. Lopez, 50 Fla. L. Rev. 867, 904 (1998) ("Making a federalism-based argument,
Rybar contended that the Machine Gun Ban unduly infringed on Pennsylvania's machine
gun laws."); see also supra note 62 and accompanying text.
129. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562-63 (1995).
130. Id. at 563.
131. Id. (pointing out that "no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye"); see
also Jennifer L. Benedict, United States v. Morrison: Progressive Legislation is Down, But
Not Out, 33 U. Tol. L. Rev. 411, 414 (2002) (acknowledging that "the Lopez Court
suggested that the lack of legislative or congressional committee findings did influence its
decision in Lopez").
132. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 279.
133. Id. at 281; see also David B. Kopel & Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking Federalism
Seriously: Lopez and the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, 30 Conn. L. Rev. 59, 84 n.103
(1997).
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firearms across state lines and their consequential indiscriminate availability
with the resulting violent criminal acts that are beyond the effective control
of the states." 134
The majority found it convincing that the Machine Gun Statute did not
"plow new ground" as had the statute at issue in Lopez, and that possession
of machine guns was a "national concern." 135 To the contrary, the majority
described the Machine Gun Statute as continuing "in the stream of prior
legislation."'136 Moreover, the court did not view the lack of express
legislative findings as problematic in upholding the constitutionality of the
Machine Gun Statute, since a long line of legislative findings for firearm
legislation in general already existed. 137 Historical legislative findings
included the desire to control the widespread traffic in firearms. 138 The
legislation was intended to "halt unregulated mail-order and interstate
consumer traffic in these weapons.., and to insure that.., weapons could
not be obtained by individuals whose possession of them would be contrary
to the public interest."' 39 Thus, the Third Circuit determined that a rational
basis for the Machine Gun Statute could be inferred from Congress's
rationale in banning the possession by felons of firearms. 140
In addition to distinguishing Lopez on procedural grounds, the Third
Circuit distinguished Rybar from Lopez on a more substantive level. The
majority determined that the Gun-Free School Zone Act regulated
possession of guns only inside school zones-a discrete area.141  The
Machine Gun Statute, however, did "not limit[] . . . [the] possession '[of]
ones own property,"' rather, "it regulates possession of... machine guns-
134. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 279.
135. Id. at 279-81.
136. Id. at 279.
137. Id. at 281; see, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 99-495, at 2, 7 (1986), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1328, 1333 (finding the proposed machine gun restrictions as "benefits
for law enforcement" and emphasizing "the need for more effective protection of law
enforcement officers from the proliferation of machine guns").
138. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 282 (citations omitted).
139. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. Id. (stating that firearm possession presented a "burden on commerce or threat
affecting the free flow of commerce" (citation omitted)).
141. Id.; see also Benedict, supra note 131, at 415 (discussing the lack of a jurisdictional
element in the Gun-Free School Zone Act); Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial
Regulations But Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 88 (1999)
(describing the Lopez majority to have "stressed that gun possession in a school zone was
not intrastate economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce"); Jon S. Vemick & Stephen P. Teret, New Courtroom
Strategies Regarding Firearms: Tort Litigation Against Firearm Manufacturers and
Constitutional Challenges to Gun Laws, 36 Hous. L. Rev. 1713, 1726 (1999) ("Lopez-based
challenges by felons and juveniles convicted of unlawful firearm possession under the Gun
Control Act have been unavailing. Each of these provisions contains a jurisdictional element
requiring some nexus with interstate commerce, a missing factor mentioned by the Lopez
Court."); supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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in a much more dispersed and extensive area."142 Moreover, "Congress
could reasonably have concluded that such a general ban of possession of
machine guns [would] have a meaningful effect on interstate commerce that
would be more substantial than the effect of banning possession within
school zones." 143
In addition to finding the statutory language in Rybar distinguishable
from the statutory language in Lopez, the court in Rybar actually found a
strong economic link between possession of a machine gun and interstate
commerce. 144 Recall that the Court in Lopez had been unable to find a link
between carrying a gun into a school zone and the interstate economy. 145 In
contrast, in Rybar, the Third Circuit was unimpressed by the argument that
the transfer of machine guns is a wholly intrastate activity. 146 Rather, the
court cited cases such as Wickard, Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,
and Perez for the proposition that it is the cumulative effect on interstate
commerce that is of ultimate significance. 147 Finally, unlike the Third
Circuit in Rybar, the Court in Lopez was concerned that in passing the Gun-
Free School Zone Act, Congress was intruding into the regulation of local
schools, "an area traditionally left for the overview and regulation by
states." 148
2. The Majority Relied on Other Circuits that Upheld the Machine Gun
Statute
The Third Circuit was not the first circuit to consider and uphold the
constitutionality of the Machine Gun Statute. 149 The Seventh Circuit
similarly upheld the constitutionality of the Machine Gun statute, finding
the statute more analogous to the "wheat-growing scheme in Wickard or the
anti-loansharking law in Perez than the Gun-Free School Zone Act in
Lopez." 150
142. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 282 (quoting Rybar, 103 F.3d at 291 (Alito, J., dissenting)); see
also Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review Have Perverse Effects?, 46 Viii. L.
Rev. 1325, 1335 (2001) ("This is the perverse effect of the aggregation principle: broaden
the statute's reach and there are more applications to aggregate, until the bar of the
substantial-effects test has been cleared.").
143. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 282.
144. Id.
145. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995); see also supra notes 58-59 and
accompanying text.
146. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 282; see also supra Part I.A.
147. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 276, 282-83 (reminding the judiciary that it is also possible to
uphold the constitutionality of the statute under the Commerce Clause as a regulation of
channels and instrumentalities); see supra Part I.B.
148. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 282.
149. Vernick & Teret, supra note 141, at 1725-26 & 1725 n.86 (citing several cases
upholding the constitutionality of the Machine Gun Statute).
150. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 283 (citing United States v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir.
1996)); see also supra Part I.B (establishing that the statutes in Wickard and Perez were
upheld).
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Other circuits upheld the constitutionality of the statute, but on different
grounds. The Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits viewed the Machine Gun
Statute as a regulation of "'the use of the channels of interstate
commerce." ' 5 1 The Third Circuit summarized the Fifth Circuit's holdings
as concluding that the statute applies only to machine guns "not lawfully
possessed before May 1986, and thus functioned principally to prohibit 'the
introduction into the stream of commerce [of] machineguns' illegally
obtained after that date."'152 The Ninth Circuit "echo[ed]" the analysis in
United States v. Kirk in upholding the constitutionality of the Machine Gun
Statute by stating "there could be no unlawful possession without first an
unlawful transfer ... [and thus] regulation of possession 'regulates
commerce' itself."'153 The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Beuckelare
described the statute as regulating "the extensive, intricate, and definitely
national market for machineguns."1 54
The Tenth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Machine Gun
Statute on the grounds that commodities are "bound up with interstate
attributes" and distinguished from the "purely intrastate" objects of the
statute's prohibition.155 Moreover, the Tenth Circuit held that the Machine
Gun Statute was consistent with earlier firearms legislation "because it
merely regulates the movement of a particular firearm in interstate
commerce."
156
Although each of these circuits applied different reasoning, the Third
Circuit majority rationalized that "[w]hatever the category relied on, it is
telling that each of our sister circuits has found that the regulation of
machine gun transfer and possession comes within Congress' power to
legislate under the Commerce Clause," and that "Lopez has raised many
false hopes" as "challenges based on Lopez [a]lmost invariably fail."' 157
By distinguishing from Lopez the Machine Gun Statute on procedural
and substantive grounds and relying on sister court theories, the Third
151. Id. at 284 (quoting United States v. Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 1996)); see
United States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791 (5th
Cir. 1995).
152. Id. (quoting Kirk, 70 F.3d at 796). Dissenting from the majority in Kirk, Judge Edith
Jones found that the only possible justification for the upholding of the Machine Gun Statute
was evaluating the statute under the substantial economic effect test, not under the channels
test as "espoused by the majority." Kirk, 70 F.3d at 801 (Jones, J., dissenting). Yet, Judge
Jones found that the Machine Gun Statute lacked a "jurisdictional element" and accordingly
"[a]s in Lopez, the possession of a machine gun covered by Section 922(o), without more, is
no more an economic activity that may substantially affect commerce than was the
possession of a firearm in a school zone prohibited by Section 922(q)." Id. at 801-02.
153. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 284 (citing Rambo, 74 U.S. at 951-52).
154. Id. (citing Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d at 784). In Beuckelaere, Judge Richard
Suhrheinrich found that the majority should have considered the Machine Gun Statute under
the substantial economic effect test but that the Machine Gun Statute lacked "a concrete tie
to interstate commerce." Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d at 788 (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting).
155. United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1521 (10th Cir. 1995).
156. Id. at 1521 n.4.
157. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 284-85 (internal quotation marks omitted and alterations in
original).
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Circuit concluded that the Machine Gun Statute was constitutional.
Through his dissent, as discussed in Part II.B, Judge Alito expressed strong
disagreement.
B. Judge Alito's Dissent
Judge Alito began his dissent in Rybar by asking, "Was [Lopez] a
constitutional freak? Or did it signify that the Commerce Clause still
imposes some meaningfil limits on congressional power?"' 158 Troubled by
the reasoning of the majority, Judge Alito did not find enough of a
difference between the Machine Gun Statute and the Gun-Free School Zone
Act to have upheld the former's constitutionality in Rybar.159 Judge Alito,
who "dissent[ed] slightly more often than the typical appeals court
judge,"'160 asserted several general reasons why the Machine Gun Statute
should be held unconstitutional. First, Judge Alito's dissent stated that both
the Gun-Free School Zone Act and the Machine Gun Statute similarly lack
a jurisdictional element in that "they do not require federal prosecutors to
prove that the firearms were possessed in or affecting interstate
commerce." 161 Second, Judge Alito stated that "in passing both statutes,
Congress made no findings regarding the link between the intrastate activity
regulated by these laws and interstate commerce," and that it is
unreasonable to confine Lopez to its own "peculiar circumstances." ' 162 Part
II.B. 1-2 explores Judge Alito's reasoning.
1. Judge Alito Rules Out Channels and Instrumentalities
Before addressing what he believed to be the majority's "two separate
theories"' 163 for upholding the Machine Gun Statute, Judge Alito first
addressed whether the Machine Gun Statute regulated channels or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Judge Alito concluded that the
158. Id. at 286 (Alito, J., dissenting); see Dean A. Strang, Felons, Guns, and the Limits of
Federal Power, 39 J. Marshall L. Rev. 385, 398 (2006) ("Perhaps because the Supreme
Court split 5-4 in Lopez, most federal appellate judges have treated that decision as a
'constitutional freak,' to repeat Judge Samuel A. Alito's colorful term.").
159. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 286-87 (Alito, J., dissenting). Some commentators have agreed
with Judge Alito's rationale in finding the similarities between Lopez and Rybar to be
striking. See Debbie Ellis, A Lopez Legacy?: The Federalism Debate Renewed, But Not
Resolved, 17 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 85, 113-14 (1996) ("Both [the Machine Gun Statute and the
Gun-Free School Zone Act] are criminal statutes which regulate the purely intrastate
possession of guns, both lack jurisdictional elements, and Congress made no findings
regarding the link between the intrastate activity, possession, and interstate commerce."); see
also Carhart, supra note 82, at 864 (discussing the fact that some commentators have found
Lopez and Rybar to have similarities).
160. Adam Liptak & Jonathan D. Glater, Alito's Dissents Show Deference to Lower
Courts, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 2005, at Al.
161. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 287 (Alito, J., dissenting); see supra note 152 (establishing that
Judge Jones in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit came to a similar conclusion in
her dissent).
162. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 287 (Alito, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 291; see infra Part II.B.2.a-b.
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Machine Gun Statute did not regulate the channels or instrumentalities of
interstate commerce. 164 He wrote that the circuits that upheld the statute on
such grounds "fundamentally misunderstood the first category set out in
Lopez."'1 65 Judge Alito concluded that to justify the statute on the grounds
that Congress is regulating channels of commerce, Congress would have to
have regulated, "for economic or social purposes, the passage in interstate
commerce of either people or goods."' 166 Moreover, Judge Alito believed
that the Machine Gun Statute would "fall within this category if it barred
the interstate shipment of machine guns, but of course that is not what it
does."'167 Rather, according to Judge Alito, the statute "goes much farther
and reaches the wholly intrastate possession of machine guns."' 168
Judge Alito additionally expressed concern with the reasoning asserted
by the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits that "'there could be no unlawful
possession under [the Machine Gun Statute] without an unlawful
transfer." ' 169  First, he argued that a semi-automatic weapon could be
converted by its owner into an automatic weapon.' 70 Moreover, a person
could have lawfully possessed a gun under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which
permits possession under governmental authority "but then exceeds the
scope of that authority or retains possession after it has terminated."' 71
Such a transfer could be wholly confined to intrastate activities without
extending to interstate activities. 172 Finally, Judge Alito wrote that the
arguments made by the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits were more in line
with the third category established in Lopez because they describe activities
that, although intrastate, have an impact on interstate activities.173
Judge Alito summarized instrumentalities of interstate commerce as "the
means of conveying people and goods across state lines, such as airplanes
and trains. This power also reaches threats to people and goods travelling
in interstate commerce, such [as] ... the setting of rates that could affect
interstate trade."'174 Moreover, Judge Alito wrote that the Machine Gun
Statute would not fall within this category even if Congress "had banned
164. See Rybar, 103 F.3d at 291-94 (Alito, J., dissenting). Although Judge Alito agreed
with the majority's focus on the substantial economic effects, he still addressed the other two
categories (channels and instrumentalities of commerce) since the majority rationalized the
overall constitutionality of the statute in part because other circuits have justified the statute
under those two categories. Id.
165. Id. at 288; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text (describing the three
categories).
166. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 288-89 (Alito, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 289.
168. Id.
169. Id. (quoting United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791, 769 (5th Cir. 1995)); see also United
States v. Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948 (9th
Cir. 1996); Kirk, 70 F.3d 791; supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
170. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 289 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Kenney, 91
F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 1996)).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
174. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 290 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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the intrastate possession of machine guns in order to prevent them from
being used to damage vehicles travelling interstate, to carry out robberies of
goods moving in interstate commerce, or to threaten or harm interstate
travellers." 75
Judge Alito found the reasoning of the Sixth and Tenth Circuits "elusive"
in terms of finding the statute to be constitutional under this instrumentality
category. 176 Both circuits described the inherent interstate component of
machine gun travel. 177 Confused by how machine gun travel inherently
encompasses interstate travel, Judge Alito summarily wrote that "machine
guns that are simply possessed intrastate and are not travelling in interstate
commerce may not be regulated under the first Lopez category, and as
previously explained, unless they are menacing interstate commerce, they
do not fall within the second category either."' 178
2. Judge Alito Agrees that Machine Guns Fall Within the Category of
Substantially Affecting Interstate Commerce
Finally, Judge Alito addressed the third category-activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce. The majority of Judge Alito's own
Third Circuit panel relied upon this third category to sustain the
constitutionality of the Machine Gun Statute. 179 Additionally, Judge Alito
conceded that this category was the most promising of all three
categories. 180  He nevertheless could not sufficiently distinguish the
Machine Gun Statute from Gun-Free School Zone Act to warrant the Rybar
majority's finding of constitutionality under the Commerce Clause.18' Part
II.B.2.a-b discuss the two theories advanced by the majority, as postulated
by Judge Alito himself, and why Judge Alito found both theories troubling.
a. First Theory: "Private, [P]urely [I]ntrastate [P/ossession of [Machine
[G]uns" Substantially Affects Interstate Commerce 182
Judge Alito addressed what he believed to be the majority's first
argument that "the private, purely intrastate possession of machine guns has
a substantial effect on the interstate machine gun market."' 183 Troubled by
this concept, Judge Alito wrote that if machine guns fell within Congress's
authority, such a theory would go so far as to "convert[] Congress'
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See United States v. Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d 781, 784 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1521 (10th Cir. 1995).
178. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 290 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 151-54 and
accompanying text.
179. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 291 (Alito, J., dissenting).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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authority to regulate interstate commerce into a plenary police power."'184
Moreover, Judge Alito wrote "that it is safe to assume that there is some
sort of interstate market for practically everything-that the purely
intrastate possession of that item will have an effect on that market, and
outlawing private possession of the item will presumably have a substantial
effect."' 185 Judge Alito interpreted Lopez to mean that the Supreme Court
did not consider possession of a gun in a school zone to be economic
activity the way possession of wheat intended wholly for home
consumption was in Wickard.186  Judge Alito then determined that
possession of a machine gun could not possibly be economic activity if
possession of a gun in a school zone was ruled not to be. 187
b. Second Theory: Purely Intrastate Possession of Machine Guns
Increases Crime at a National Level
Judge Alito believed the majority's second theory to be that Congress
had a rational basis for concluding that "the purely intrastate possession of
machine guns increases the incidence of certain crimes" on a national level
sufficiently to warrant congressional control of intrastate possession of
machine guns.' 88 Moreover, Judge Alito wrote that he thought the majority
to believe that
[i]n order to bring this case within the third Lopez category, it is not
enough to observe that violent criminals, racketeers, and drug traffickers
occasionally use machine guns in committing their crimes and that these
crimes have interstate effects. Rather, there must be a reasonable basis
for concluding that the regulated activity (the purely intrastate possession
of machine guns) facilitates the commission of these crimes to such a
degree as to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.189
Yet, Judge Alito found that no "empirical proof' existed to draw a link
between intrastate possession of a machine gun, national crime, and
interstate commerce.1 90 In this part of his dissent, Judge Alito conceded
that the interstate flow of machine guns would impact interstate commerce,
but was troubled by the leap that the courts made in finding that intrastate
possession of machine guns could also have such an impact on interstate
commerce. 19 1 Judge Alito was also troubled that when Congress made its
finding regarding guns in general, Congress "had no occasion" to consider
184. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.; see also Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 133, at 84 n.103 ("[T]he possession of a
machine gun on one's property has no more genuine connection with interstate commerce or
commerce of any sort than does possession of a gun within a school zone." (citing Rybar,
103 F.3d at 291 (Alito, J., dissenting)).
188. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 292 (Alito, J., dissenting).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at292-93.
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whether intrastate possession of a machine gun would impact interstate
commerce. 192 But more importantly, "none of the laws in connection with
which those findings [for weapons in general] were made reached purely
intrastate possession without requiring proof in court of a jurisdictional
link."'193 Judge Alito thus determined that the Third Circuit needed "at least
some empirical support before [it] sustain[ed] a novel law that effects 'a
significant change in the sensitive relation between federal and state
criminal jurisdiction.'"194
C. Political Considerations
In addition to Judge Alito's interpretation of legal precedent, political
considerations may have played into Judge Alito's decision. For example,
although Justice Scalia concurred in Raich, some have speculated that his
feelings toward the war on drugs colored his overall opinion. 195 Moreover,
both Justices Thomas and Scalia have supported movements away from gun
control legislation. 196 Additionally, although the "reasoning in Judge
Samuel A. Alito Jr.'s decisions is mostly methodical, dry and respectful of
precedent,.. . the technical quality of his writing can mask bold and solidly
conservative conclusions on issues like abortion, gun control and the death
penalty."' 197 While the decisions at issue focused for the most part on the
Commerce Clause, considering Judge Alito's and his colleagues' political
leanings may enlighten the public on other reasons beyond legal precedent
that may factor into judicial outcomes.
III. THE MAJORITY IN RYBAR CORRECTLY INTERPRETED COMMERCE
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Judge Alito Was Misguided
Although Judge Alito raised some interesting points, his opinion that
Rybar was analogous to Lopez was rightfully rejected by his fellow Third
Circuit judges. On a broad level, Judge Alito has been criticized for letting
his loyalty to federalism get the better of him in Rybar.198  More
192. Id. at 293.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 294 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).
195. See Eric R. Claeys, Raich and Judicial Conservatism at the Close of the Rehnquist
Court, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 791, 814 (2005) (raising the possibility that "Justice Scalia
trimmed [in Raich] because he cares more about the War on Drugs than he does about
federalism").
196. See People for the American Way, Sensible Gun Control,
http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=16626 (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).
197. Adam Liptak & Jonathan D. Glater, The Paper Trail: Rulings that Are Lucid and
Methodically Based, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 2005, at A25.
198. Neil A. Lewis, In Cases Involving Federal Government, Nominee Is Seen as
Favoring Authority of the States, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 2005, at A28 (stating that in Rybar,
"Judge Alito... seemed to throw in his lot with those legal theorists, including many current
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specifically, however, both of Judge Alito's arguments against upholding
the Machine Gun Statute were faulty. The next section addresses the
weaknesses of Judge Alito's criticisms of what he believed to be the
majority's two main theories. 199
1. Judge's Alito's Criticism of the Majority's First Theory Was
Problematic
In trying to diminish what he believed to be the majority's first
argument, 200 Judge Alito focused on a common factor between Lopez and
Rybar-that both statutes at issue involved possession of a firearm-
instead of focusing on the actual nature of the possession of that firearm in
each situation.201 Judge Alito concluded that because both statutes involve
firearms, neither involved an economic activity. 20 2
While it is indisputable that both statutes involved firearms, Judge Alito
failed to consider properly the fact that the Gun-Free School Zone Act
regulated possession of a weapon in a discrete area that was decidedly
noneconomic.20 3 Judge Alito was incorrect in concluding that the Machine
Gun Statute involves as noneconomic an activity as possession of a gun in a
school zone.
Judge Alito found the distinction between possessing a gun in a school
zone and general possession too "subtle for [him] to grasp. '20 4 But, to
dismiss possession of a machine gun as noneconomic simply because the
distinction is subtle does not mean that no distinction exists. The reasoning
in United States v. Lopez was itself complicated and based on subtle
distinctions.20 5 What was so significant about Lopez was that after years of
judicial deference to congressional legislation, the Court finally found a
subtle enough distinction to conclude that the link to interstate commerce
was simply too tenuous to support the legislation. 20 6 Yet the Court in Lopez
never suggested that future statutes would be held to any less of a standard
and that simple subject matter similarities (such as statutes involving
firearms) would warrant overturning legislation. Judge Alito's conclusion
that the statute must be overturned merely because the differences in the
statute are too "subtle" is hardly convincing.
justices, who say Congress has assumed too much authority in recent decades and needs to
be brushed back while the power of states should be restored").
199. This section will not address Judge Alito's findings regarding instrumentalities and
channels because there is not a controversy surrounding these two Commerce Clause
categories. See supra Part II.B. 1.
200. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
201. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
202. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
203. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
204. United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 292 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting).
205. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
206. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, Judge Alito's conclusion that possession of a machine gun
was just as noneconomic as possession of a gun in a school zone is
similarly weak.207 Judge Alito wrote,
The activity that the Lopez Court found was not "economic" or
"connected with a commercial transaction" was a type of intrastate
firearm possession, i.e., the possession of a firearm (including a machine
gun) within a school zone. At issue here is another type of purely
intrastate firearm possession, i.e., the purely intrastate possession of a
machine gun. If the former must be regarded as non-economic and non-
commercial, why isn't the same true of the latter .... [Furthermore,] the
most natural reading of Lopez is that the simple possession of a firearm,
without more, is not "economic" or "commercial" activity in the same
sense as the production of wheat in Wickard and that therefore such
possession cannot be regulated under the Wickard theory.20 8
The Supreme Court itself, however, set forth its own "true" reading of
Lopez in Morrison: "[A] fair reading of Lopez shows that the noneconomic,
criminal nature of the conduct at issue was central to [the Court's] decision
in that case" because .'possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no
sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere,
substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce."' 20 9
Thus, the noneconomic aspect of the Gun-Free School Zone Act was not
just about the "simple possession of a firearm" as suggested by Judge Alito,
but rather only the possession of a firearm in a discrete area, such as a
school zone, which was not viewed as a venue for economic activity.
Moreover, possession of a machine gun is economic activity with a
connection to interstate commerce because, "in many situations possession
[of a machine gun] would result only from an unlawful transfer, and
Congress could have reasonably concluded that possession of machine guns
could stimulate demand for machine guns, resulting in more illicit transfers
of them." 210 The Machine Gun Statute broadly precludes any possession;
thus, the activity of buying and selling machine guns effortlessly fits into
such a definition. 211 Simply possessing a gun in a school zone does not
necessarily include the buying and selling of such a gun.212 Possession of a
gun in a school zone is limited to the activity of holding a gun in one's
control or custody in and around a school.213 While a purchase and/or sale
of that gun may have led to such possession, the Gun-Free School Zone Act
does not explicitly address such transfers.
207. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
208. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 291-92.
209. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-11 (2000) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at
567).
210. Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 1253, 1275
(2003).
211. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
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Finally, had the Machine Gun Statute been limited, for example, to
"possession in a place of worship," perhaps Judge Alito's rationale that the
Machine Gun Statute is unconstitutional would have been workable, since
the scope would be as limited as in the Gun-Free School Zone Act. Instead,
by focusing on the connection that both statutes involve noneconomic
firearms, Judge Alito tenuously applied the Lopez holding to Rybar and was
rightly outnumbered by his fellow Third Circuit judges.214 While Judge
Alito may have been somewhat justified in finding that all firearms deserve
similar treatment under the law, that is a matter of legislative judgment in
the first instance; and, in any event, Congress cannot simply legislate
without properly considering the limits of the Commerce Clause.215
2. Judge Alito's Criticism of the Majority's Second Theory Was Also
Problematic
Judge Alito's second attempt to challenge the basis of the majority's
opinion in Rybar was just as troubling as his first challenge. 216 Judge Alito
relied on the rationale in United States v. Bass that seemingly required some
evidence linking the underlying activity to interstate commerce.217
However, while Bass required a "demonstrated nexus" and Congressional
"language that is clear and definite," the Court in Bass did not actually
require empirical data to demonstrate that nexus.218
Moreover, in enacting the Machine Gun Statute, Congress focused on the
need to control firearms because possession of a machine gun (while
possibly only intrastate) could instigate crimes in the home state or across
the border. 219 Additionally, earlier Commerce Clause precedent, such as
Wickard and Lopez, upon which Judge Alito so heavily relied,220 does not
support requiring Congress to demonstrate the nexus more than it already
had done by looking at the historical evolution and the need for federal
firearm statutes to prevent criminal activity. 221 While the Court in Lopez
considered legislative findings helpful, the Court did not deem such
findings dispositive, 222 suggesting that Judge Alito's demand for empirical
support would not survive Supreme Court scrutiny. As such, firearms that
have a clear economic component and have a strong enough link to
214. United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting).
215. See Christie, supra note 15, at 979 (underscoring the importance of proper deference
to Congress when legislating under the Commerce Clause).
216. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
217. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (stating that the Court "will not be
quick to assume that Congress has meant to effect a significant change in the sensitive
relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction").
218. Id. at 349.
219. See Rybar, 103 F.3d at 282.
220. Id. at 282-83.
221. See supra Part II.B-C.
222. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
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interstate commerce are subject to congressional legislation even though the
statute may lack empirical support.223
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Rybar despite
Judge Alito's vigorous dissent.224 However, with two new Justices on the
Supreme Court, one of whom is Justice Alito, and an opinion such as
Gonzales v. Raich in place, considering the possible outcome of a challenge
to the Machine Gun Statute, should it ever reach the Supreme Court, is
worthwhile. Part III.B evaluates the current composition of the Supreme
Court and what, if anything, the future may hold for the Machine Gun
Statute.
B. What If the Supreme Court Granted Certiorari on the Machine Gun
Statute?
1. Justice Alito's Likely Position on Raich
Since Justice Alito is now a Supreme Court Justice and Raich was the
most recent Commerce Clause case, Justice Alito's potential views on
Raich are somewhat predictable. Justice Alito often has been compared to
Justice O'Connor, whose seat he was appointed to fill.225 In her dissent in
Raich, Justice O'Connor expressed a concern similar to the one Judge Alito
expressed in Rybar, regarding the lack of evidence to provide the link
between the act in question and interstate commerce. 226 Moreover, Justice
O'Connor did not find the fact that the CSA involved a comprehensive
statutory scheme (similar to the machine gun statute) to be dispositive and
concluded that medicinal use of marijuana could be separated from non-
medicinal use.227 This reasoning is similar to that of then-Judge Alito in
Rybar, who was not impressed by the history of the Machine Gun Statute's
statutory scheme.228 Judge Alito had emphasized his frustration with
Congress's lack of investigation and proof regarding the link between
interstate commerce and the act in controversy. 229 He wrote,
[Tihe majority cite[ed] congressional findings made in connection with
prior firearms legislation concerning the problems resulting from the
interstate movement of firearms .... However, the question here is not
whether the interstate flow of firearms substantially affects interstate
commerce; rather, the question is whether the entirely intrastate
possession of machine guns has such an effect, and none of the findings
223. See supra Part II.
224. Rybar, 522 U.S. 807 (1997).
225. See Lewis, supra note 198, at 28 ("Although the dissent [in Rybar] appears to place
Judge Alito in the conservative camp that is trying to reshape Congressional [sic] authority
and the relationship with the states, it puts him generally in line with the record of Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, whom he [succeeded].")
226. See supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
228. See supra Part II.B.
229. See supra Part I.B.
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noted above speak to that question. Indeed, Congress had no occasion to
consider that question when it made those findings, since none of the laws
in connection with which those findings were made reached purely
intrastate possession without requiring proof in court of a jurisdictional
link.230
Clearly, both then-Judge Alito and Justice O'Connor demanded more
that just a comprehensive statutory scheme for a statute to pass muster
under the Commerce Clause. Both wanted proof of a nexus to commerce of
the particular statute in question and refused to rely on history. 23' Thus,
Justice Alito likely would not have joined the majority in Raich, but rather
would have dissented, as did Justice O'Connor.
Finally, while commentators have focused on the similarities between
Justice Scalia, who concurred with the majority in Raich,232 and Justice
Alito,2 33 Justices Alito and Scalia do have significant differences.
234
Arguably, one major difference is their take on federalism. 235 Because
Justice Alito has been recognized for favoring regulation by states over the
federal government, whereas Justice Scalia has been recognized sometimes
to favor federal regulation, Justice Alito would likely not have voted with
the majority to uphold the CSA in Raich.236 Thus, from a federalism
perspective, it is fairly clear that Justice Alito would not have signed on
with the majority in Raich.
2. The Supreme Court Would Likely Uphold the Machine Gun Statute
a. The Precedent Clearly Favors Upholding the Machine Gun Statute
Even though Justice Alito would likely have dissented in Raich, since the
majority in Raich found the CSA as a whole to be constitutional, the
230. United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 292-93 (1996) (Alito, J., dissenting).
231. See supra notes 111-20, 192-94 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
233. See Ilya Somin, Alito's Libertarian Streak, Cato Inst., Nov. 11, 2005,
http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pubid=5188.
234. See id. For example, "[i]n sharp contrast to Scalia, Alito has often voted in favor of
the free exercise rights of minority religious groups, even against laws that are not
deliberately intended to harm minority religions." Id. See, for example, Fraternal Order of
Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999), where Alito
"joined an opinion holding that Muslim police officers had a right to grow beards (as
required by their religion) so long as the city allowed a secular health-related exemption
from its no-beard policy." Somin, supra note 233. But see Employment Division v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990), where Justice Scalia "wrote a decision holding that the Constitution in
most cases does not protect religious groups against the effects of 'neutral' laws." Somin,
supra note 233.
235. See Smith, 494 U.S. 872; see also, Somin supra note 233.
236. See Somin, supra note 233 ("Alito's position differs from Scalia's recent opinion in
Gonzales v. Raich, where the Justice argued that the commerce power justified upholding a
federal ban on the possession of marijuana, even for noncommercial medical purposes
permitted under state law.").
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Supreme Court would likely uphold the constitutionality of the Machine
Gun Statute if the Court were to grant certiorari on a case raising the issue.
The Machine Gun Statute regulates transfer and possession of machine
guns in interstate commerce. 237 In Rybar, Judge Alito was skeptical about
the idea that personal possession of a machine gun could possibly impact
interstate commerce more than possession of a gun in a school zone.238
Both the majority and concurring Justices in Raich, however, found no
issue with Congress regulating possession of noneconomic activities as long
as interstate commerce is ultimately affected. 239
Moreover, both the majority and the concurring opinion in Raich did not
find that Lopez presented any impediment to upholding the statute. 240 Both
the majority and concurrence agreed that Lopez involved regulation of guns
in discrete areas where no economic link existed between possession of
such guns and interstate commerce so as to warrant federal regulation. 241
Yet, both the majority and concurrence in Raich agreed that the CSA was
unlike the Gun-Free School Zone Act in that general possession of
marijuana could impact interstate commerce. 242 Thus, the majority of the
current Supreme Court would likely agree that the Machine Gun Statute,
like the CSA, does not limit its scope to noneconomic venues such as
school zones. This translates into the somewhat surprising notion that the
broader the legislation, the more likely the legislation will withstand
Supreme Court scrutiny under the Commerce Clause. 243
b. The CSA and the Machine Gun Statute Share Several Similarities
As noted above, both the Machine Gun Statute and the CSA are part of
larger comprehensive regulatory schemes that have been upheld as
constitutional over the years. 244 While such a comprehensive scheme is not
dispositive, it is highly influential on the outcome of Commerce Clause
challenges, as demonstrated by the Supreme Court in Raich and by multiple
circuits, such as the Third Circuit in Rybar.245  To declare statutes
unconstitutional where there has been large legislative commitment seems
unlikely; yet as proven in Lopez, if the link to interstate commerce is found
237. See supra notes 125 and accompanying text.
238. See supra Part II.B.
239. See supra Part I.D.
240. See supra Part I.D (acknowledging that the majority and concurrence in Raich came
to the conclusion that the CSA should be upheld but on different grounds).
241. See supra Part I.D.
242. See supra Part I.D.
243. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 46 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that
"[i]f the Court is right, then Lopez stands for nothing more than a drafting guide: Congress
should have described the relevant crime as 'transfer or possession of a firearm anywhere in
the nation'-thus including commercial and noncommercial activity, and clearly
encompassing some activity with assuredly substantial effect on interstate commerce").
244. See supra notes 81-82, 93, 132-40 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 81-82, 93, 132-40 and accompanying text.
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to be too tenuous, such statutes will likely not be upheld.246 Moreover, both
possession of marijuana and possession of a machine gun could arguably
have beneficial purposes, 247 while both have been linked to dangerous
activities directly and indirectly. Finally, both the Machine Gun Statute and
the CSA were written broadly to encompass all possession, thereby
eliminating the necessity to draw tenuous links to interstate commerce. 248
Both statutes are thus quite distinguishable from the Gun-Free School Zone
Act, where the possession was limited to school zones. 249
c. The Current Composition of the Supreme Court Is Telling, Though Not
Conclusive
The current makeup of the Supreme Court is obviously different than it
was at the time of Raich. Moreover, federalism concerns have tended to
impact some of the Justices' opinions. Justices Breyer, Stevens, David
Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg all dissented from Lopez, but all were
either part of the majority or concurrence in Raich,250 suggesting they might
support broadly construing Congress's power to legislate under the
Commerce Clause. Justice Scalia joined the majority in Lopez but
surprisingly concurred in Raich and thus is seemingly unpredictable when it
comes to federal legislation. 251  Justice Anthony Kennedy joined the
majority in both Lopez and Raich, but similar to Justice Scalia, has often
voted for state power over congressional power.252
Two out of the three Raich dissenters, the late Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, have been replaced by Chief Justice John
G. Roberts and Justice Alito. Justice Thomas, who dissented in Raich,
would likely find the Machine Gun Statute troubling due to his "originalist"
approach to Commerce Clause legislation, his pro federalism tendencies,
and his concurring opinion in Lopez.253 Justice Alito's opinion regarding
the Machine Gun Statute, assuming it remains unchanged, is quite clear
from his dissent in Rybar.254 Chief Justice Roberts's views on this subject,
246. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
247. Different beneficial purposes may include using marijuana medicinally or possessing
a gun for self-protection.
248. See supra Parts I.D, II.A.
249. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
250. See supra Part I.D.
251. See Claeys, supra note 195, at 815 ("Raich makes clear that Scalia will side with the
nationalists in the unlikely event that the Court entertains Commerce Clause challenges to
other federal schemes that regulate local activities on the pretense of guaranteeing certain
consequences for interstate trade."). Compare id., with Greenhouse, supra note 112 (noting
that Scalia has "over the past decade. .. voted with [the] majority [in] a series of decisions
curbing Congressional power and elevating the role of the states within the federal system").
252. See Greenhouse, supra note 100 ("The surprise was.., that Justice Kennedy and
Scalia defected from their usual states' rights allies to vote to uphold federal power.").
253. See Claeys, supra note 195, at 812-15; see also supra notes 121-22, 196 and
accompanying text.
254. See supra Part II.B.
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however, are not quite as pronounced. Chief Justice Roberts did support a
Commerce Clause challenge as a circuit judge, suggesting he might be
critical to federal legislation.255  Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts has
similarly been considered a federalist. 256
The Justices' prior views on Lopez and Raich and their typical stances on
federalism are hardly dispositive, however. There is a chance that political
considerations and personal feelings towards other issues could also impact
each Justice's outlook-after all, medicinal use of marijuana and possession
of a machine gun draw vastly different personal and political reactions. 257
Although Justice Scalia is known for his feelings against drugs, Justices
Thomas, Scalia, and Alito have been characterized as supporting
movements away from gun control legislation. 258  Yet, political
considerations are not always conclusive either.259 It is quite possible that,
"years from now.., the most significant impact that our new Justices
[could] have had on the law has little to do with contemporary hot button
social issues such as... guns and more with federal regulation that has for
decades been justified under the Commerce Clause. '260 While considering
political opinions may clarify the rationale behind judicial decisions, the
significance of legal precedent should not be minimized.
CONCLUSION
As established above, the Supreme Court remained consistent with the
precedent established in Lopez through the recent decision in Raich. Judge
Alito's dissent in Rybar was thus not only misguided in light of the
precedent at the time, i.e., Lopez, but now appears completely misguided in
light of both the current position of the Supreme Court as set forth in Raich
and current position of the majority of every circuit that has considered the
Machine Gun Statute's constitutionality thus far.261 Therefore, based on
precedent alone, the Machine Gun Statute's longevity is promising.
Additionally while the composition of the current Supreme Court
provides further insight on the future of the Machine Gun Statute, it does
not necessarily provide closure to the issue. Although the outcome in Raich
is helpful in analyzing the current opinions of the Justices regarding
Commerce Clause issues, two of the Justices are no longer on the bench.
Moreover, since Justice Alito's reasoning was mistaken based on the
255. See Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (encouraging a Commerce Clause challenge
against an application of the Endangered Species Act).
256. See Lewis, supra note 198, at 28 (suggesting both Justice Alito and Chief Justice
Roberts have federalist tendencies).
257. See supra Part II.C.
258. See supra notes 195-97.
259. See supra Part II.C.
260. Joel B. Eisen, Rapanos, Carabell, and the Isolated Man, 40 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1099,
1107 (2006).
261. See supra Parts I.D, II.A.2 and accompanying text.
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precedent available at the time and would remain inconsistent according to
Raich, there is no telling what could happen should the Court actually
consider the Machine Gun Statute with Justice Alito and Chief Justice
Roberts on the bench. While all reasonable indicators suggest the Machine
Gun Statute would survive Supreme Court scrutiny, some believe that
political considerations could taint the analysis of the precedent. After all,
it has been said that the appointment of both Justice Alito and Chief Justice
Roberts places the United States "on the brink of a watershed for the
conservative movement. ' 262 Yet, for the Court to so denigrate precedent
simply seems unlikely, and thus the Machine Gun Statute would likely
survive Supreme Court scrutiny.
262. David D. Kirkpatrick, In Alito, G.O.P. Reaps Harvest Planted in '82, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 30, 2006, at Al.
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